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THE EXPANDED CONCEPTION OF SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: 






Security is an elastic and diverse concept that can be understood in different 
forms, depending on its objects: the perception of threats, the protected 
values, and the means through which these values can be protected.1 The 
changing perception of security threats that already emerged in the 1980s,2 
and ways in which these threats are addressed, has led to comprehensive and 
scientific studies of security concept.3 While the multidimensionality of security 
is now widely acknowledged in the discourse of security, its impacts on and 
challenges to international law are yet to be fully examined. 
 
International security law, at the present stage of development, is primarily 
found in the United Nations (UN) collective security system. This is based on 
the norm of non-use of armed force under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter and 
the institution of the UN Security Council vested with the primary responsibility 
for the maintenance of international peace and security under Article 24 of the 
Charter.4 Thus, collective security is a product of law, based on the delegation 
of power by sovereign states to a collective entity,5 providing the normative 
foundation for and means of regulating the behaviour of sovereign states and 
conflict among them. Collective security provides institutionalised procedures 
for legalising collective response, designed at least originally to address 
traditional, military-oriented threats to the maintenance of international peace 
and security. However, challenges to the sovereign-centred collective security 
have arisen, particularly after the end of the Cold War, due to the diversity of 
perceived security threats, the rise of transnational security concerns, the 
greater role played by non-state actors, and the alleged ineffectiveness of 
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existing international arrangements in responding to dynamic security 
challenges.6        
   
This article considers the above challenges posed to the UN collective security 
system, with a focus on the impacts of an expanded security concept upon 
international law with respect to four different objects of security: national 
security; international security; human security; and regime security. To that 
end, Section I outlines three different dimensions through which the concept of 
security has been expanded, providing a conceptual foundation for the 
following analysis of its impacts upon international law. Section II examines the 
impacts of an expanded security concept in relation to the aforementioned four 
different objects of security, exploring the opportunities and challenges 
presented to international law. Section III then discusses the limits of collective 
security in effectively responding to the expanded conception of security within 
the existing framework of international law. Section IV revisits alternative 
security approaches presented in the past, evaluating their potential to 
complement collective security in dealing with diverse security objects and 
threats.     
 
I. The Expanded Conception of Security 
 
The traditional view of security is defined in military terms, with the primary 
focus on state protection from threats to national interests. Thus when Hans 
Kelsen published Collective Security under International Law in 1957, he 
confined the scope of his study to ‘the protection of men against the use of 
force by other men’.7 It was inextricably linked to national security, meaning 
the protection of territory from external military threats and attacks, which was 
recognised as the ultimate raison d’être of sovereign states. However, such a 
traditional notion of security, as defined by reference to national survival, 
physical protection of state territory, and military power, has expanded its 
scope in the second half of the 20th century, particularly since the end of the 
Cold War. 
 
First, the idea of international security, as distinct from national/state security, 
emerged with the development of a collective security system. The League of 
Nations recognised an act of aggression and an act of war that commenced in 
disregard of the war avoidance procedures under its Covenant as security 
threats for all members of the League.8 The establishment of the UN Security 
Council with the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international 
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peace and security,9 and its operation in practice, has gradually fostered an 
acceptance among states of the idea that the security of the international 
community, not simply the security of one state, can be undermined. This was 
no exception during the Cold War, when strategic balance of power rivalries 
and nuclear deterrence to stabilise international relations remained the 
dominant international security concerns.10  
 
The notion of ‘human security’ has also added a new dimension to the 
expansion of the security concept, since the UN Development Programme 
(UNDP) captured it into policy discourse in its 1994 Human Development 
Report.11 Human security has subsequently provided a theoretical foundation 
for the development of the ‘responsibility to protect’ concept as a policy 
agenda,12 which was officially endorsed in the 2005 World Summit Outcome.13  
One of the novel aspects of this concept is that human populations, as distinct 
from sovereign states and the international community, are recognised as 
objects to be protected from threats of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing 
and crimes against humanity.  
 
Second, the territorial context for security has changed. Security has 
traditionally been understood in relation to state sovereignty and its territorial 
integrity, as expressed in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. However, as 
technological advancement has enabled exploration and exploitation beyond 
state borders, security concerns have extended geographically and spatially to 
different maritime zones,14 outer space,15 the Arctic,16 Antarctica,17 and even 
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cyber space.18 Those new security frontiers are also not immune from the 
influence of an expanded concept of security, posing challenges to the existing 
legal regimes governing extra-territorial and non-territorial activities. Unlike the 
traditional territorial context in which sovereign states are the only objects of 
security concerns, it is possible to find a range of different objects which raise 
security concerns in these new frontiers.19 Thus, the international legal regimes 
that govern extra-territorial and non-territorial activities may form the subject 
of security inquiry in their own right. 
 
Third, there has been a gradual move towards recognising more diverse issues 
as posing security threats, spawning a growth of security literature in the areas 
of economic security,20 environmental security,21 energy and resource 
security,22 food security,23 bio-security,24 and health security.25 The expansion 
of security issues was formally acknowledged when state leaders gathered to 
meet at the Security Council in 1992 and referred to a range of non-military 
sources of instability in the economic, social, humanitarian and ecological fields 
as threats to international peace and security.26 The 2004 Report of the UN 
Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel identified economic and social threats, 
transnational organised crime, as well as inter-state conflict, internal conflict, 
terrorism, and weapons of mass destruction as global security threats.27 The 
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former UN Secretary-General’s 2005 Report, In Larger Freedom, adds poverty, 
deadly infectious disease, and environmental degradation to the list, on the 
grounds that these can have equally catastrophic consequences.28 However, 
many of those ‘global security concerns’ are still closely linked to the national 
security of (often powerful) sovereign states, and those non-traditional security 
threats tend to become significant, as will be elaborated below in Section II.2, 
only to the extent that states themselves recognise the causal relationship 
between non-traditional security threats and potential armed conflicts – 
traditional international security threats. 
 
II. The Impacts of Securitisation for International Law  
 
Security was analytically approached as a discourse when the Copenhagen 
School developed their ‘securitisation’ theory from a speech-act perspective in 
language theory.29 Rather than understanding security as a fixed, defined 
notion, the Copenhagen School attempted to understand the discourse of 
security as the processes of constructing a shared understanding of what is 
considered a threat.30 In such processes, it identified ‘referent objects’ (which 
are seen to be existentially threatened) as distinguished from ‘securitising 
actors’ (who securitise issues) and ‘functional actors’ (who affect the dynamics 
of decision-making).31 According to their analysis, for example, the 
environment can be seen as a referent object in securitising environmental 
concerns by a certain group of people acting as the securitising actors through 
their interaction with polluting companies and other stakeholders as functional 
actors. 
 
In the following analysis, challenges of securitisation to international law are 
examined in relation to four different levels of referent object: sovereign states, 
the international community, human beings, and international regimes. The 
referent object for security has traditionally been the sovereign state. Central 
to security studies for many years has been the survival of a sovereign state and 
hence national security. However, as explained above, the idea of international 
security evolved through the development of a collective security system 
particularly under UN authority. In addition, the expanded conception of 
security in the international arena has led to the recognition of human security 
and regime security as distinct referent objects of security.  
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II.1 National Security 
 
Traditionally, national security is focused upon the physical protection of a 
state’s territory (and of their nationals by extension) from military attacks by 
another state. This focus is reflected in the express recognition of the “inherent 
right of individual or collective self-defence” in Article 51 of the UN Charter. 
However, national security concerns have also diversified, which reflects more 
contemporary, acute public concerns that pose greater threats to individuals 
and groups of people. The evolved conception of national security has posed 
challenges to the interpretation and application of existing norms and rules of 
international law in dealing with non-traditional security threats. Thus, for 
example, the shift from a law enforcement approach to a military response to 
transnational terrorist activities that are launched by non-state actors without a 
state’s involvement has challenged the conventional understanding that the 
right of self-defence can only be exercised in the case of an armed attack by 
one state against another state.32  
 
The language of security from vaguely defined threats to national interests has 
the danger that it could be used to distort security discourse and justify states 
stepping back from their international legal obligations, particularly those 
which protect individuals and their human rights. Illustrative is the ‘global war 
on terror’ following the 2001 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, 
which pushed the United States to cross the line in defiance of its legal 
obligations under the Geneva Conventions33 in handling Al-Qaeda detainees 
most infamously in Guantanamo Bay.34 Other states also followed suit, by 
taking extreme counter-terrorism measures notwithstanding human rights 
concerns.35 The view that fundamental human rights and values should be 
balanced against, and reconciled with, national security has subsequently 
mustered some support.36  
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The UN collective security system did little to ensure that national security 
measures were in compliance with the existing rules of international law, but 
instead was used as a legal platform for such measures, through the Security 
Council’s adoption of Resolution 1373 (which declares that terrorism is contrary 
to the purposes and principles of the UN).37 Although Resolution 1373 can be 
seen as an internationally concerted response to “the shared perception of a 
common danger, not simply to individual States, but to a system of world public 
order”,38 the resolution left a large scope for states to take advantage of it in 
order to pursue extreme national security measures in the name of counter-
terrorism.39 In fact, the absence of a definition of terrorism in the resolution is 
considered deliberate, and has left states with a significant degree of discretion 
in defining terrorism and to abuse the Security Council’s mandate to target 
particular individuals or groups.40 The subsequent call on states to implement 
counter-terrorism measures in accordance with international human rights 
obligations has done little to change the way states implement those 
measures.41     
 
Another example is tighter border control against asylum seekers, as 
illuminated by Australia’s infamous ‘Pacific Solution’.42 European countries have 
also taken advantage of immigration control as a method of dealing with 
migrants suspected of being associated with terrorists,43 sending them back to 
their country of origin, despite the possibility of persecution or ill treatment. 
Those countries have even been upfront about their idea and desire that 
national security considerations should be given weight in balancing the need 
to ensure human rights protection of those who are suspected of being 
                                                 
37
 SC Res 1373, 28 September 2001. 
38
 W.M. Reisman, ‘In Defense of World Public Order’, American Journal of International Law 
2001-95, p. 834. 
39
 See generally, V.V. Ramraj, M. Hor, and K. Roach (eds) Global Anti-Terrorism Law and Policy, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 
40
 For details, see especially, B. Saul, Defining Terrorism in International Law, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008, pp. 48-51. 
41
 SC Res 1456, 20 January 2003, para. 6. For details, see, eg, E.J. Flynn, ‘The Security Council’s 
Counter-Terrorism Committee and Human Rights’, Human Rights Law Review 2007-7, pp. 371-
384; A. Marschik, ‘The Security Council’s Role: Problems and Prospects in the Fight against 
Terrorism’, in: G. Nesi (ed.) International Cooperation in Counter-Terrorism, Aldershot: Ashgate, 
2006, pp. 72-73. 
42
 The ‘Pacific Solution’ was introduced by the then Howard Government, which excised 
Australia’s offshore islands from the migration zone for immigration purposes and made an 
arrangement with small, neighbouring countries for transfer of those who arrived by boat on 
offshore places for processing of their asylum applications. For details, see, M. Crock, B. Saul, 
and A. Dastyari, Future Seeker II: Refugees and Irregular Migration in Australia, Sydney: 
Federation Press, 2006, pp. 115-125. 
43
 See generally, A. Edwards, ‘Human Security and the Rights of Refugees: Transcending 
Territorial and Disciplinary Borders’, Michigan Journal of International Law 2009-30, pp. 763-
807; G. Noll, ‘Securitising Sovereignty? States, Refugees and the Regionalisation of International 
Law’ in E. Newman and J. van Selm (eds) Refugees and Forced Displacement: International 
Security, Human Vulnerability, and the State, Tokyo: UN University Press, 2003, pp. 277-305; 
B.S. Chimni, ‘Globalisation, Humanitarianism and the Erosion of Refugee Protection’, Journal of 
Refugee Studies 2000-13, pp. 243-264.  
22 INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 2011 
 
involved in terrorist activities.44 Again, the Security Council’s collective security 
measures, including the terms of Resolution 1373, have been rather 
instrumental in the adoption of extreme border control measures to prioritise 
national security.45    
 
II.2 International Security 
 
As discussed above, the idea of international security evolved through the 
development of a collective security system, particularly under UN authority. 
The key to that development lies in the concept of a threat to the peace, a 
breach of the peace, and an act of aggression under Article 39 of the UN 
Charter. The fact that the Security Council’s practice enlarged the concept of a 
threat to the peace is well documented.46 One might take the view that such 
practice simply represents the Security Council’s broader understanding of 
international security. 
 
In 2000, the Security Council discussed the impact of HIV/AIDS on peace and 
security in Africa under the Council Presidency of US Vice-President, Al Gore.47 
This marked the first time that the Security Council dealt with a health issue as 
a security concern. In 2007, the UK government circulated a concept paper as 
the basis for an open debate in the Security Council, which explored the 
relationship between energy, security and climate.48 Although no action has 
been taken as a result of those discussions to date, commentators have 
suggested that non-traditional security threats, such as public health threats, 
environmental degradation and climate change, should be accommodated 
within the purview of the Security Council through expansive reading of its 
mandate for the maintenance of international peace and security.49 
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However, the Security Council’s embrace of a broader conception of 
international security is not so straightforward. During the 2000 debate on the 
impact of HIV/AIDS on peace and security in Africa, some states expressly 
identified those non-traditional security issues as “virulent seeds of conflict”,50 
emphasising the direct link between those issues and the mandate of the 
Security Council.51 The attempt to draw the Security Council’s attention to non-
traditional security threats met strong hostility during the 2007 debate on the 
relationship between energy, security and climate. Having considered climate 
change to be a development issue, the Group of 77, China and Russia criticised 
this debate as the “ever-increasing encroachment by the Security Council on 
the roles and responsibilities of other principal organs of the United Nations”.52 
There is a good legal reason for taking such a cautious attitude, for 
international institutions are required to operate within the competence 
defined by the provisions of their constitutive instrument.53 Thus, the 
expansion of the concept of international security will entail one of the two 
consequences: (1) posing challenges to the jurisdictional limits of international 
institutions and organs, such as the Security Council; or as will be examined 
below (2) requiring a wider range of mechanisms to respond to diverse security 
threats than the collective security system.   
 
II.3 Human Security 
 
Human security is a human or people-centred and multi-sectoral approach to 
security, which means the protection of people from critical and pervasive 
threats and situations, and the empowerment of people to develop their 
potential, through concerted efforts to develop norms, processes and 
institutions that systematically address insecurities.54 The concept remains 
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controversial in many respects,55 and its role in expanding the referent objects 
of security is no exception. Peter Hough, for example, understands the human 
security approach as both a ‘widener’ and ‘deepener’ of the traditional narrow 
security conception, suggesting that the referent object includes not only 
communities and groups but also individual persons, be they government 
ministers or private individuals, who can make a securitisation move.56 Barry 
Buzan, on the other hand, warns against the ‘reductionism’ caused by human 
security in international security thinking, emphasising the collectivity of 
security enterprises as an essential element of referent objects.57 In any event, 
as far as the impact of securitisation on international law is concerned, the 
scope for private individuals to play a role in securitisation remains minimal.58  
 
Despite the controversial aspects of human security, there is no doubt that the 
new concept has paved the way for a shift in the focus of various security 
issues, from the domain of national security to a much greater spectrum. The 
shift is significant, for example, in environmental security discourse, given that 
even though many of the environmental issues are global ones, the 
consequences of environmental degradation are usually observed and felt at 
the local or regional levels.59 As Karen O’Brien notes, reframing environmental 
change as a human security issue does influence the questions that are asked, 
the research that is prioritised, and the solutions and policies that are 
proposed.60 Further, the adoption of the Ottawa Treaty,61 the Rome Statute,62 
and the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child,63 can be 
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seen as legal developments motivated and facilitated by embracing human 
security and prioritising it over national security.64 
 
It is yet to be fully explored what opportunities are presented and what 
challenges are posed to the existing framework of international law by 
embracing the notion of human security.65 International law is a system of law 
based on the consent of sovereign states and hence does not allow much scope 
for accommodating non-state entities and individuals as subjects of 
international law.66 It would be too much to expect that the human security 
approach will have positive impacts on the debate about humanitarian 
intervention as a legal justification for the use of armed force,67 due to the 
inherent dilemma posed by competing norms and moral imperatives, which 
cannot simply be resolved by embracing human security as a substitute of 
national security.68 However, a human security optic may assist us in defining 
new security concerns or redefining the terms of debate surrounding 
traditional security threats.69 Farer points to such potential of human security 
in the norm that requires a consideration of proportionality under international 
humanitarian law in such a way as to demonstrate that the legitimate military 
objective cannot be achieved by other means, rather than simply that civilian 
casualty is not disproportionate to the military objective.70  
 
The notion of human security has posed challenges, on the other hand, to the 
operation of the UN collective security mechanism. The Security Council has 
recently been more active in indicating its readiness to embrace human 
security when they refer to, for example, children in armed conflict,71 women 
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and peace and security,72 and the protection of civilians more generally.73 
However, the Security Council’s practice of deploying peacekeeping forces (as 
part of traditional collective security measures) with a mandate to protect 
civilians has caused normative, operational and ethical dilemmas.74 Concerns 
have similarly been expressed for the Security Council’s role in implementing 
the responsibility to protect concept (influenced by the notion of human 
security), particularly because of the discretion bestowed upon this collective 
security body, which “implies variable commitment totally different from the 
consistent alleviation of suffering embodied in the responsibility to protect”.75  
 
II.4 Regime Security 
 
The final dimension to the expansion of the security concept involves an 
‘upward’ shift of focus from nation-states to international institutions and 
regimes. There has been a shift for some time towards institutional 
development of various international regimes as a means of advancing shared 
agendas among ‘national oligarchies’, which are not necessarily shared by their 
domestic constituents. Philip Allott regards this phenomenon as ‘a global 
orchestra of all orchestras of oligarchy’ behind the emergence of international 
aristocracy.76 By the same token, B.S. Chimni claims that a transnational 
capitalist class is shaping international laws and institutions in the era of 
globalisation.77 The legitimacy of international institutions has thus been called 
into question partly because of the lack of democratic process or input into 
their operation and decision-making.78 This issue can be approached as ‘regime 
security’ from the viewpoint of those who are driving those institutional 
developments or in favour of pursuing particular institutional values and goals.  
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Within the domestic domain of a state, regime security becomes an issue when 
the political foundations of state institutions are weak and the governing elites 
need to establish effective state rule to deter violent challenges.79 In contrast, 
international institutions, perhaps counter-intuitively, are less susceptible to 
violent challenges posed directly by domestic constituents of states. It is more 
likely that the security of an international regime is threatened by a measure 
adopted by a state pursuing a new or reinforced national security agenda.  
 
A notable example of a regime that has been seen in light of its own security is 
the international economic regime. Although the nexus between security and 
international economy had already been discussed during the Cold War,80 the 
economy became a new security issue in its own right, due to the high level of 
economic interdependence which exposed states to external economic 
events.81 Concerns grew over competition among economic superpowers such 
as the US, Japan, and the emerging European bloc (EEC, EC, EU) which was 
perceived to pose a great threat to the national economic security in each 
state, especially when foreign economic policy involved aggressive government 
support for protecting domestic producers against foreign competitors.82 
Safeguarding structural integrity has become a common interest in ensuring the 
stability of the international economic system supported by multilateral 
economic institutions such as WTO and IMF. However, it is also arguable that 
greater economic security at the international level has been achieved at the 
expense of greater vulnerability of weak, under-developed countries to 
exploitation and economic pressure especially in trade negotiations.83 
 
The legal impacts of the notion of regime security specifically arose when the 
WTO Dispute Settlement Panel adopted a test to assess whether a measure 
was of a type that would threaten the security and predictability of the 
multilateral trading system.84 The Panel’s broad formulation of the test by 
reference to the WTO regime security was subsequently rejected by the 
Appellate Body.85 The European Communities recognised the danger of 
                                                 
79
 R. Jackson, ‘Regime Security’, in: A. Collins (ed.) Contemporary Security Studies, 2nd ed., 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010, pp. 186-87. 
80
 See, e.g., K. Knorr, ‘Economic Interdependence and National Security’, in: K. Knorr and F.N. 
Trager (eds) Economic Issues and National Security, University Press of Kansas, 1977, pp. 1-18; 
W.F. Mondale, ‘Beyond Détente: Toward International Economic Security’, Foreign Affairs 
1974-53(1), pp. 1-23. Cf. M. Mastanduno, ‘Economics and Security in Statescraft and 
Scholarship’, International Organisation 1998-52, pp. 825-854. 
81
 R.O. Keohane and J.S. Nye, Power and Interdependence, Boston: Little Brown, 1977. The 
international economic system can also be an entire security object in its own right. See, Buzan 
1983, supra note 1, ch. 5. 
82
 Cable 1995, supra note 20, pp. 308-312. 
83
 See, e.g., P. Drahos, ‘Negotiating Intellectual Property Rights: Between Coercion and 
Dialogue’, in: P. Drahos and R. Mayne (eds) Global Intellectual Property Rights: Knowledge, 
Access and Development, Hampshire and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002, pp. 172-174. 
84
 US – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products (WTO Dispute Settlement 
Panel), p. 297, para. 7.44, WT/DS58/R (1998). 
85
 US – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products (WTO Appellate Body), pp. 42-
43, para. 116, WT/DS58/AB/R (1998). 
28 INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 2011 
 
invoking regime security in this way when they cautioned, in their third party 
submission, that such an approach would make trade concerns paramount to 
all other concerns.86 Thus, a cautious approach has so far prevailed when 
regime security is intended to be used as a basis for restricting a sovereign 
state’s choice of measures. The regime security of the UN collective security 
system, by implication, would not provide a strong legal basis for compensating 
for the legitimacy deficit in the Security Council’s expanded activities that 
stretch the limit of its competence in response to more diverse security 
concerns.  
 
III. Challenges to Collective Security 
 
As discussed above, the expansion of the security concept, in terms of both 
security objects and security threats, provides not only opportunities for legal 
developments but also challenges to the existing norms and rules of 
international law. Those legal challenges have been testing and stretching the 
limit of the UN collective security system in various ways. Yet, the extent to 
which the UN collective security system, primarily through the Security 
Council’s practice, is capable of responding effectively to the expansion of the 
security concept is limited, insofar as its institutional competence is premised 
upon the traditional conception of international security – physical protection 
of sovereign states from external military attacks in the common interest of the 
international community. Although its institutional development has to a 
certain extent accommodated a greater range of security threats such as 
internal armed violence and transnational terrorist threats, the Security 
Council’s role in collective security will not always provide a solution to non-
traditional security concerns.       
 
For example, when the relationship between energy, security and climate was 
discussed in the Security Council in 2007, there was a sharp division of views as 
to whether it was a proper forum to discuss and take action on climate 
change.87 Even those countries in favour of the Security Council playing a role in 
addressing climate change stopped short of calling for forcible measures, 
expecting instead that the Council would “sound an alarm bell”,88 or envisaging 
its role as part of conflict prevention.89 Similar reactions were observed when 
the Security Council discussed the issue of HIV/AIDS in 2000. Namibia observed 
that the Security Council would contribute in a major way to minimising the 
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impact of HIV/AIDS “*b+y effectively addressing conflict situations in Africa”.90 
Jamaica pointed to the Security Council’s role in conflict prevention to 
eliminate the environment that is conducive to the spread of HIV/AIDS.91 
 
The traditional understanding of security as military-oriented and focused on 
national security is inevitably linked to the idea that it is by military means that 
security goals are achieved. Even though the concept of security has expanded 
with a wider variety of referent objects, the tendency to seek military solutions 
to non-military threats remains strong. Thus, commentators have warned 
against understanding climate change as a security issue, because it risks 
militarising a foreign policy problem.92 Likewise, concern has been expressed 
that securitising HIV/AIDS might promote military responses to the disease with 
the power to override the civil liberties of those infected.93 There is little doubt 
that armed forces are incapable of meeting the challenges posed by non-
traditional security threats such as climate change, which rather require policy 
responses such as more effective re-allocation of budgets and resources.   
 
Likewise, collective enforcement mechanisms are inadequate as a response to 
non-traditional security threats and even in dealing with traditional security 
threats, such as physical violence, when the security concern lies with national 
security (as distinct from international security) or human security. The 
prevailing military-oriented approach has been criticised as inadequate in 
dealing with national security threats common throughout the world, such as 
those posed by transnational terrorist groups.94 Also, as discussed above, the 
Security Council has faced difficult challenges in directing military enforcement 
and peacekeeping missions with a mandate to protect civilians,95 which can be 
considered an attempt to embrace human security within the collective 
security mechanism.96 The military-oriented approach to civilian protection in 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which has been reinforced through a 
greater strength of troop deployment and further clarification of their civilian 
protection mandate,97 has reportedly hindered effective operations.98 Critics 
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have urged a more holistic, ‘bottom-up’ approach to civilian protection to 
harness the potential of human security.99    
 
IV. Alternatives to Collective Security 
 
Alternative security mechanisms to complement collective security measures 
are not alien to the security discourse in international relations. First, alarmed 
by the nuclear arms race and then US President Reagan’s nuclear deterrence 
policy, the idea of ‘common security’ emerged in the 1980s, to build confidence 
amongst states and promote disarmament.100 Although the idea was originally 
designed to address concerns that unilateral national security measures might 
escalate the nuclear arms race, it may still retain its value to deter unilateral 
attempts to eliminate the political, economic, social, and environmental 
conditions that generate threats to international security in general.101 Such 
unilateral responses to non-traditional international security threats may not 
only involve a violation of the international legal obligations which states are 
bound to, but also pose a threat to human security or to the security of an 
international legal regime.       
 
Second, the emphasis on non-military means of seeking security is also found in 
the concept of ‘cooperative security’, which can be traced back to the early 
1990s, particularly in the context of the Conference on Security and Co-
operation in Europe (now Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe: 
OSCE).102 It is based on the idea that security must be based on common 
institutions and norms which states are expected to comply with.103 Unlike 
common security, which emphasises the common interest in maintaining 
international security, cooperative security acknowledges that each state has 
an equal right to security, and embraces rivalry and tensions as the basis for 
building political dialogue.104  
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The concept of cooperative security is particularly relevant to an increased 
competition and tension over gaining access to energy and natural resources, 
for which multilateral institutions are likely to play the most effective role.105 
Cooperative security provides a normative foundation for facilitating 
integration into an institutional dialogue,106 through which an agreement could 
be reached about how states can cooperate in responding to and reconciling 
competing national security issues. Illustrative examples include the creation of 
International Seabed Authority for the regulation of mineral exploitation in the 
deep seabed,107 and the adoption of the Madrid Protocol to promote Antarctica 
as a natural reserve,108 both of which can be seen as cooperative legal 
responses to potential threats to the security of energy, the regime, and the 
environment. In the deep seabed and Antarctica, where natural resources 
remained beyond the reach of commercial exploitation, national interest in 
enhancing resource security was put aside in favour of establishing an 
international legal regime. Such pre-emptive regulation serves its purpose of 
preventing fierce competition among developed states to exploit natural 
resources pursuant to their own national security interests. However, various 
external factors, such as technological development, climate change, and global 
energy needs, might threaten the security of those international legal 
regimes.109 
 
Furthermore, the 1975 Helsinki Accords,110 a unique product of Cold War 
politics, provided a formal basis for the human rights agenda in the political and 
security discourse with the Soviet Union. Based on this ethos, the OSCE has 
developed a ‘comprehensive security’ approach, which covers the politico-
military, economic/ecological, and human dimensions.111 More recently, the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has expressly adopted the 
principle of comprehensive security to address non-traditional security 
issues.112 Comprehensive security acknowledges the multidimensional nature 
of security and tends to focus on process rather than substance.113 As such, it 
can be understood as relating closely to the protection of human security and 
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encouraging diverse approaches to addressing human security threats in a 
comprehensive way. However, in the ASEAN context, it is rather regarded as 
facilitating the mutually constituted relationship between the regime security 
and economic development.114 While it has a potential to promote human 
security, the ambiguity of the approach diminishes its legal value as a workable, 
alternative security mechanism.    
 
All these alternative approaches to security originate from the bipolar Cold War 
rivalry. However, it is worthwhile revisiting these alternative approaches as a 
conceptual and normative foundation for complimenting collective security to 
address non-traditional security threats, from the perspective of different 
security referent objects. These alternative security approaches can be 
explored without challenging or interfering with the Security Council’s authority 
and role in collective security, which may indeed benefit from more focused 
deployment of its resources. Currently, only a few institutionalised forums such 
as OSCE and ASEAN embrace and implement alternative security approaches. 
These alternative security approaches are still at a primitive stage of 
development, but have the potential of further development in a wider range 
of institutional forms, as, unlike collective security mechanisms, they involve 
more de-centralised, dynamic processes of decision-making. Further 
development of those alternative security approaches in various institutional 
practices can arguably address various security threats without a need to 
stretch the limit of the UN collective security system.     
 
The development of institutional practices to embrace these alternative 
security approaches must have due regard to, and be informed by, Third World 
anxieties driven by centuries of western imperialist colonisation and a strong 
scepticism against any western sponsored enterprise that promotes western 
values.115 Even the concept of human security, despite its attempt to shift the 
focus from sovereign states to human beings, is suspected in the Third World of 
having a ‘donor driven agenda’ – an agenda that is concerned about achieving 
the donor’s political and economic aims rather than what developing countries 
truly value and require.116 Such anxieties were also reflected in the UN General 




                                                 
114
 M. Caballero-Anthony, ‘Non-Traditional Security in Asia: The Many Faces of Securitisation’, 
in: A.F. Cooper, C.W. Hughes, and P. de Lombaerde (eds) Regionalisation and Global 
Governance, London: Routledge, 2008, p. 193. 
115
 See generally, A. Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005; B. Rajagopal, International Law from Below, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. 
116
 See, P. Upadhyaya, ‘Human Security, Humanitarian Intervention, and Third World Concerns’, 
Denver Journal of International Law and Policy 2004-33, pp. 86-89. 
117
 UN GAOR, 63rd session, 97th-101st meetings, UN Doc A/63/PV.97-101, 23-28 July 2009. See 
also, R. Thakur, The Responsibility to Protect: Norms, Laws and the Use of Force in International 
Politics, London: Routledge, 2011, pp. 156-157. 
33 AMSTERDAM LAW FORUM VOL 3:3 
Conclusion 
 
The concept of security has expanded, particularly after the end of the Cold 
War, in terms of both security objects and security threats. For example, 
climate change, technological development, demand for resources, growing 
environmental concern, and the growth of overlapping legal regimes and 
regulations, are all factors that potentially give rise to security concerns of 
various states and other actors. While the expansion of the security concept 
can be seen as a policy response to accommodate those new challenges, its 
analytical framework is yet to be fully examined in the discipline of 
international law, which would guide us on how we should conceive those new 
security threats and address them internationally. 
 
The UN collective security mechanism, installed at the end of World War II, 
provides an institutionalised process of legalising collective decisions to adopt 
extreme security measures against the traditional, military-oriented threats to 
the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states, in the common interest of the 
international community. Unlike traditional international security threats, this 
article has argued that the diversity of security threats perceived by different 
security referent objects will not be adequately reflected or addressed within 
the UN collective security framework. The cracks in the attempts to stretch the 
limit of collective security to address these non-traditional security issues have 
already appeared, posing various challenges to the existing norms and rules of 
international law. Whereas international law may adapt to new, non-traditional 
security challenges in the long term, military-oriented, extra-legal measures to 
protect national security in the short term may threaten the security of other 
referent objects, including existing international legal regimes and groups of 
people. More regulated ways of resorting to and addressing security concerns 
are thus required to address non-traditional security challenges 
comprehensively, without diminishing legal obligations and restrictions or 
reaching outside the international legal framework. 
 
To that end, revisiting the alternative approaches to the maintenance of 
security that originated during the Cold War rivalry would be a worthy attempt. 
The idea of common security, cooperative security, and comprehensive security 
may have the potential to provide a conceptual and normative foundation for 
complementing collective security in addressing non-traditional security threats 
from the perspective of different security referent objects. However, any 
universal move to institutionalise those alternative security approaches will 
need to take due account of, and be informed by, Third World anxieties and 
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